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Abstract
After over two decades of renewing temporary counterterrorism laws in Britain from the early 
1970s, making such measures permanent with the Terrorism Act 2000 was not necessarily a 
predictable or predetermined outcome. The Northern Ireland peace process was underway, the 
Labour party who had voted against temporary counterterrorism laws for over a decade was 
newly back in power, and historical context pointed to an inconclusiveness around how effective 
such laws actually were in reducing insecurity. In this article I argue a key element helping 
explain this transition from temporary to permanent counterterrorism law lies in how particular 
threat and referent identities were constructed in official British discourse. Drawing on empirical 
research from a relational-securitization analysis of official British discourses from the late 
1960s to the present, this paper argues that processes of identity construction were essential to 
introducing and justifying the Terrorism Act 2000. The deployment of particular threat and 
referent labels established in discourse before events such as 9/11 or 7/7, such as “international” 
terrorism, helped enable the shift from counterterrorism law from temporary emergency response 
to permanent policy practice. 
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There have been few mistakes bigger or more durable than the PTA [Prevention of 
Terrorism Act]. Its powers of exclusion, arrest and seven-day detention, the 
miscarriages of justice to which it gave rise and its powers of stop and search at the 
ports have alienated generations of Irish people and assisted the IRA with its 
recruitment from the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. 
(Conor Gearty and John Kimbell, 8 March 1995[2])
As the House will be aware, the Government propose the introduction of permanent 
counter-terrorist legislation, which we hope will do away with the need for the 
annual renewal of temporary provisions…Terrorism, and the threat of terrorism from 
a range of fronts, is likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future.
(Jack Straw, 16 March 1999[3])
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The largely permanent counterterrorism laws in Britain starting with the Terrorism Act 2000 were 
not necessarily a predetermined outcome considering the historical context and political 
backdrop preceding them. There remains no commonly understood definition of terrorism to 
guide lawmakers and factors at the time such as material evidence of risk and political party 
positioning did not automatically point to making temporary domestic counterterrorism laws 
permanent practice. As such, especially considering tensions between civil liberties, human 
rights, national security and the increasingly normalized presence of such laws needs to be 
investigated with historical and analytical care. In this article I argue a key element helping 
explain this transition from temporary to permanent counterterrorism law lies in how particular 
threat and referent identities related to terrorism were constructed in official British discourse. 
This article stems from a larger study engaging in a discourse analysis of publically accessible 
official texts related to British counterterrorism law from the late 1960s to the present[4]. This 
study’s relational sensibility[5] and securitization[6] based framework focuses on how processes 
of identity construction[7] affect material outcomes of counterterrorism over time[8]. 
Securitization is most simply defined as a process whereby an existential threat(other) is 
constructed and accepted as risking the survival of a referent object(self), thereby justifying 
measures going beyond the bounds of normal politics:
The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: 
When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve 
sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise 
have to be obeyed[9]. 
Securitization theory strengthens relational investigations of counterterrorism law by 
encouraging inquiries into what security does instead of just what security is[10]. This supports 
research on terrorism focusing not only on material issues of concern, but also on how socially 
constructed issues of identity affect outcomes in security policy. 
However, rather than survey the entire period from this broader study or go into further research 
design specifics, this article focuses on one particular temporal snapshot: the late 1990s and 
transition from the temporary Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland) Act 1973 (EPA)[11] and 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA)[12], to the permanent Terrorism 
Act 2000[13]. Primary empirical sources are legislative acts with “terror” explicitly in their 
language, parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction and passage of these laws, and 
parliamentary research papers and reports. Secondary source material came largely from 
historical research related to Northern Ireland as well as research on counterterrorism more 
generally[14]. Of specific interest for this article’s temporal focus and transition to permanent 
counterterrorism law are the EPA, PTA, Legislation Against Terrorism Consultation Paper (Cm 
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4178)[15], Terrorism Act 2000, and parliamentary debates surrounding these texts during the 
1990s[16]. After briefly discussing historical and material context related to British 
counterterrorism, the article will summarize how processes of threat/referent construction 
observed in official British discourses were key elements to enabling temporary counterterrorism 
law be made permanent policy. The conclusion will then discuss why a focus on issues of 
identity matters for research and practices of counterterrorism law.
The scene leading to permanent British counterterrorism law
By the nineties, after almost two decades of renewing temporary counterterrorism laws, there 
was still no official consensus on whether or not key acts at the time (PTA and EPA) were 
especially effective. Ongoing violence was interpreted both as a need for counterterrorism law to 
continue, as well as counterterrorism law failure[17]. In addition, the Downing Street Declaration 
from 1993, paramilitary ceasefires from 1994, prison release schemes from 1997[18], Good 
Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, and overwhelming disapproval of the 1998 Omagh 
bombing, all contributed to beginning public processes of desecuritization related to terrorism in 
Northern Ireland. To say “desecuritization” is by no means to say there was no longer a threat to 
security in Northern Ireland. Rather “desecuritization” indicates how the perception of that 
insecurity and associated threat identities was shifting from a language of “terrorism” to one 
increasingly aligned with “dissident”. Whether reflecting on Omagh (29 killed, over 200 injured) 
or the killing of human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson, a risk of violence and sense of insecurity 
persisted. Despite this continuing risk, processes of threat/referent construction securitizing 
terrorism repositioned particular identities to minimize the threat from “Irish related” terrorism, 
instead bolstering the danger of “international” terrorism. These reconstructions of threat identity 
reinforced a shift in perspective on what terrorism “was”, helping enable a major shift in 
counterterrorism law. 
While domestic and international insecurities remained, such issues did not necessarily appear as 
existential threats requiring temporary counterterrorism laws introduced, as emergency measures 
needed to be accepted as permanent policy. Most high profile attacks unconnected to Northern 
Ireland referenced in official discourses were not directly against Britain. Instead, they were 
often connected to specific groups and targets, conceivable to interpret as one-off horrors rather 
than imminent threats of terrorism to a particular British referent. A 1994 car bomb outside the 
Israeli embassy and Balfour House in London, 1997, Luxor tourist attack in Egypt, 1998, 
Johannesburg restaurant bombing in South Africa, and 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East 
Africa, are all evidence of political violence, but not necessarily an indication of an existential 
threat demanding Britain establish permanent domestic counterterrorism law.
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In addition, British political dynamics at the time would not have inevitably predicted a move to 
make UK counterterrorism law permanent. After over a decade of Conservative leadership and 
intensified criminalization policies also affecting counterterrorism [19], Labour was elected back 
to power in 1997. While it was Labour who introduced a key piece of emergency 
counterterrorism legislation with the PTA in 1974[20], it was also Labour who consistently voted 
against PTA and EPA renewals for over a decade prior to this late nineties reelection:  
The Labour Party continues to believe that emergency legislation cannot resolve the 
problems which exist in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the grievances to which the 
operation of emergency powers give rise are in themselves one of the causes of the 
continuing violence[21].
Thus while having Labour in power clearly could have been a catalyst to remove temporary 
counterterrorism laws and instead focus on existing criminal law or international 
cooperation[22], what we see is quite the opposite. Not only did Labour introduce legislation 
collapsing the PTA and EPA into the single, UK-wide, Terrorism Act 2000[23], but they also 
began an array of other institutional changes furthering the permanence and normalization of 
exceptional counterterrorism more broadly[24]. There continued to be public disagreement[25] 
over counterterrorism law effectiveness considering miscarriages of justice[26], construction of 
suspect communities reinforcing sentiments of alienation[27], and a continuing lack of trust 
between communities and law enforcement[28]. These consequences, especially when combined 
with an overall consensus on Northern Ireland that “negotiated political settlement is--as we are 
all agreed--the only way forward”[29], could have encouraged moving away from 
counterterrorism law rather than making such laws permanent. 
Transitioning language leading to the Terrorism Act 2000
With historical context and political positioning unable to fully explain the transition to 
permanent counterterrorism law, this leads us back to the article’s focus on repositioning inquiry 
on issues of identity and discourse. An essential factor to this change in legal trajectory, 
introduced by Labour with the Terrorism Bill and Legislation Against Terrorism Consultation 
Paper in 1998, rests in the particular ways threat and referent identities were constructed in 
official British discourse. Processes of securitization helped enabled and justify permanent 
counterterrorism law by newly distinguishing three terrorist others in official discourse: 
domestic, Irish, and international[30]. To move from temporary measure to permanent law while 
also beginning public negotiations with actors recently considered “terrorists”, threat/referent 
labels necessary to successfully securitize terrorism had to be reconfigured. The threat was 
reconstructed and repositioned in official discourse to establish new borders around who were, 
and were not, illegitimate terrorist actors. Previous “others” were yoked to legitimate politics, 
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highlighting a new acceptance of former threats (for example Gerry Adams to John Hume, Sinn 
Féin to the SDLP), with discursive spaces around identity then redesigned to allow new terrorist 
threat labels to arise (domestic, Irish, international)[31]. 
Rather than being “true” or measurable in some objective way, Irish, domestic, and international 
threat labels are temporarily stabilized representations of generalized possibilities of insecurity. 
These socially constructed forms influence collective perception on threat entities through 
processes asserting misguided assumptions of objectivity around particular boundary markers. 
This assumption of objectivity around each form’s identity is easily destabilized when put under 
greater historical and contextual scrutiny. In referencing transactions of Semtex between actors in 
Northern Ireland, Libya, and Czech Republic in the 1970s, substantial financing of Northern Irish 
groups from the United States[33], or the murders of British soldiers in Germany and British 
citizens in the Netherlands[34], we see as much an international dimension to Irish-related 
terrorism as a domestic dimension to international terrorism[35]. This inconsistency of definition 
underlying a deployed terrorist label reinforces how: 
Terrorism is not a self-evident, exceptional category of political violence. Rather, it is 
a social construction – a linguistic term or label that is applied to certain acts through 
a range of specific political, legal and academic processes. This is not the same thing 
as saying terrorism is not real; there are real people causing real harm and death to 
other real people. Instead, it is to say that the meaning of (and subsequent responses 
to) those real acts of violence is determined by a complex series of social and 
political practices which contribute to the labeling and categorization of events[36]. 
These relational processes of labeling have substantial symbolic and material effects. 
Considering how terrorism has transitioned over time in collective meaning to embody the 
ultimate illegitimate use of violence, calling something terrorism can invoke unquestioned uses 
of state force. A democratic rhetoric of terror shuts down opposition described as “soft on 
terrorism”, bolstering exceptional state response as increasingly normal. In short, labeling 
political violence terrorism not only affects intersubjective structures of understanding around 
what particular risks “are”, but also the spaces for possible agency during policy-making that 
enable what types of security response is possible[37].
When introduced during the Troubles in the early 1970s, British counterterrorism law was 
viewed as highly exceptional, aimed at “the defeat of terrorism and the extension of normal 
policing”[38]. Such powers were “unprecedented in peacetime”[39], necessary to “enable 
preventive action to be taken against people who appear to the Secretary of State to be involved 
with terrorism but against whom it is not possible to bring charges under the present law”[40]. To 
justify making those laws permanent then it was essential to establish the threat as more serious 
and dangerous than “ordinary” criminals, as unquestionably illegitimate. At the same time, 
discourses and policy could not be seen as losing touch with historical, social and political roots 
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underneath much of the violence, nor could they be seen as ignoring international conventions on 
human rights[41]. The increasingly elusive nature and heightened danger of terrorism as 
constructed in discourse helped satisfy both of these requirements. 
The securitization of terrorism in official British discourses of the 1970s constructed terrorism as 
a serious threat to the maintenance of peace and order, stemming from hooligan gangs and 
subversive unrest[42]. This contrasts with 21st century discourses constructing terrorism as ever-
changing, threatening the referent’s very way of life in addition to its right to life as such, 
reaffirming how “something about terrorism makes its threat inflate, genie-like, way beyond its 
actual physical scale”[43]. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the threat was established as 
distinct from ordinary crime but encompassing a similar lack of political or moral legitimacy. 
This aligned with a government committed to hardline policies and increasing processes of 
criminalization generally. Such processes were indeed referenced by opposition during debates 
on counterterrorism law, “that the record of the past 13 years shows that the Tory Government 
have been no more successful in their battle against terrorism than in their fight against 
crime”[44]. Irrespective of this comparison, majority opinion on counterterrorism was left 
unchanged, and the renewal of temporary counterterrorism laws would continue.
By the mid 1990s, the securitization of terrorism in official British discourses was again shifting. 
Processes of threat construction divided terrorism into three forms, Irish, domestic, and 
international, while expanding the danger of terrorism generally, paving the way for permanent 
counterterrorism law[45]. Terrorism was simultaneously being broadened[46] and narrowed in 
official discourse. On the one hand it was expanding with a language of “terror” increasing in 
overall frequency. At the same time, the threat was narrowed into three forms bolstering a 
perceived entity-like character, regardless of labels such as “international terrorist” ultimately 
dependent upon indeterminate boundaries. 
While events throughout the 1900s could be viewed as “terroristic”, an explicit language of 
terrorism in official British discourse was not observed as commonly used until the latter part of 
the century[47]. Terms of terror have been observed as far back as the late 1700s but their 
contemporary usage indicating highly illegitimate phenomena is more recent. A snapshot of how 
many times the word “terrorism” comes up during parliamentary debates captures this escalation 
in frequency in the simple blue bar graphs below[48]:
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Figure 1.1
This image presents us with 21,415 hits for “terrorism” during the 1900s. The earliest “terrorism” 
hit is seen in 1920, under the subject of “Maintenance of law and order”, while the end of the 
century leads to a substantial increase in usage more broadly. A search of “terror” and “terrorist” 
in the nineties alone resulted in 6300 and 6218 hits respectively. If parliament met 365 days a 
year, which they did not, that would mean “terror” was rhetorically deployed on average over 17 
times each day during debate[49]. However, despite the impact this change in frequency may 
have on our picture of terror in official discourse, such results should not be interpreted as some 
kind of analytic revelation. It is not merely the frequency of a term that indicates its influence (or 
not) on counterterrorism law formation and justification. It is also how that term is situated in the 
discourse, and what intersubjectivities such position and terminology then substantiate. 
Alongside increasing frequency was an increasing association of the threat with explicitly 
immoral characteristics, positioned as somehow intrinsic to terrorism. While some trends of 
criminalization from 1970s and 1980s continued, the threat began to depart from such framings 
as increasingly illegitimate:
Peter Brooke (Conservative): Nevertheless, simply because the crimes committed by 
terrorists are so heinous, because they are such an affront to human decency and to 
the civilised values that we share with our friends throughout the world, and because 
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these terrible deeds move us to great and justified anger, I should like to make clear 
to the House the Government's strategy to defeat terrorism and to explain how the 
Bill is an integral part of that strategy…For terrorism, by its very nature, represents a 
relapse into barbarism and savagery that unites the entire civilised world in 
determined and unquenchable opposition[50].
Such issues of illegitimacy and morality surrounding terrorism intensified over time, with the 
threat presented not just as brutal, but evil, the referent not just Britain, but civilization and 
democracy. 
Jack Straw (Labour): Our commitment to the rule of law is one of the crucial 
differences between the principles of democracy and the evil dogma of the 
terrorists[51]. 
By positioning essentially uncontestable, yet vague, notions of good and evil around particular 
threat and referent constructions, alternative responses to proposed permanent counterterrorism 
laws were politically unsustainable: Who can explain any disagreement to fighting the evil of 
terrorism aimed at destroying a democratic way of life? Actors were rhetorically coerced into 
accepting a position they would perhaps otherwise reject[52]. The discursive delineation of 
inside/outside borders along Irish, domestic, and international labels of terrorism combined with 
these commonplaces of immorality to exacerbate practices of inclusion and exclusion, 
reinforcing problematic us/them boundaries while limiting policy choices.
“Civilised”, “evil”, “western”, and “democratic” became key rhetorical commonplaces 
underlying relational framings and intersubjectivities to stabilize particular threat/referent 
identities in the nineties, successfully securitizing terrorism and justifying permanent 
counterterrorism law[53]. While activities related to Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s 
could also have been constructed as “evil” or counter to “civilised” society, it was the 1990s that 
dramatically presented terrorism as not just a risk of violence and disorder, but an especially 
dangerous risk to a particular democratic way of life. Framings were general enough to be neither 
provable nor disprovable, but were almost impossible to disagree with politically:
Jack Straw (Labour): He [Lord Lloyd] concludes that the reason why terrorism 
produces that singular horror and revulsion is that terrorist crime is seen as an attack 
on society as a whole, and our democratic institutions. It is akin to an act of war. 
Those are powerful words, but they accurately define the nature of terrorism and the 
threat that it poses to our society[55]. 
The late 1990s represent an important shift in how terrorism was constructed in official British 
discourse, helping legitimize the transition from temporary to permanent counterterrorism law. 
Intersubjective structures underpinning the securitization of terrorism affected material 
counterterrorism law outcomes by stabilizing threat and referent identities through particular 
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deployments of rhetorical commonplaces and framings. Constructing Irish, domestic, and 
international terrorist labels changed the rules of the game, yoking previous threats to legitimate 
political actors, thereby redesigning intersubjectivities around terrorism to justify a shift to 
permanent counterterrorism law. 
Why a focus on threat construction in counterterrorism law matters
How threat identities are constructed matters not only for material counterterrorism law, but also 
for collective understandings of identity related to these laws stretching beyond the realms of 
policy-making. Processes of threat/referent construction around terrorism produce 
counterproductive results such as the establishment of suspect communities, increasing the 
alienation and insecurity of already marginalized groups[56]. As assumed borders of terrorist 
forms are sometimes taken to be objective representations, categorizations of identity may bolster 
unhelpful, or even damaging, collective understandings and actions. The division of terrorism 
along three identity labels in official British discourses should not be accepted as inevitable. 
Instead, such identities and practices need to be analytically problematized as a product of 
historically contingent process and social construction. 
Instead of constructing three particular terrorist identities, officials could have defined the threat 
by methods of violence. This would have perhaps acknowledged security concerns without 
provoking problematic boundary assumptions inherent to labels such as international, domestic, 
or Irish[57]. Or, officials could have focused on specific actors such as Al Qaida, instead of using 
labels such as “international” that are forever open to interpretation and potential 
misappropriation. The point is not to advocate a particular policy position, but to highlight the 
socially constructed nature of threat labels and demonstrate that alternatives were possible: the 
way relations unfolded around terms such as “international terrorism” and the Terrorism Act 
2000 was not the way it had to be. 
How does language sustain particular stabilizations of the ultimately undefinable threat of 
terrorism, and how are such stabilizations reconfigured or renegotiated over time? It is clear that 
21st century constructions of terrorism have intersubjective roots in processes of identity 
construction beginning well before 9/11 or 7/7 as is frequently assumed. With changing context 
able to reinforce intersubjective understandings of identity from prior discourse, socially 
constructed boundaries can take on the appearance of objective durability. This durability may 
take hold irrespective of historical precedent or practical effectiveness, and requires further 
analytic pause, reflection, and inquiry. 
Even while acknowledging this potential risk of durability from socially constructed labels, there 
are key junctures in history when substantial redirections in discourse and policy-making take 
place. While structures of meaning establish certain constraints on political agency over time, as 
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seen through rhetorical coercion, this does not mean agency is completely removed. To imply 
that structures of understanding around identity eliminate agency would be to mistakenly remove 
responsibility, accountability, and choice from political decision-making. An interesting and 
potentially quite important example of policy moving away from earlier discourses of threat/
referent construction can in fact be seen in recent developments in UK counterterrorism. 
On the heels of recent counterterrorism reviews supporting a reduction in pre-charge detention 
time and lapse of control orders, the latest version of CONTEST released in July of 2011 has 
made a clear departure from discourses of terrorist threat labeling in previous versions. Rather 
than keeping the title from its 2006 and 2009 forms, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy for Countering International Terrorism”, it now reads “CONTEST: The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism”[58]. The word “international” has been removed 
from the strategy’s title. Though it is still deployed in the main text, this changed title 
dramatically repositions dominant patterns of terrorist threat construction in official British 
discourse. This shift demonstrates how even as particular patterns of threat/referent construction 
(such as “international terrorism”) promote certain structures of understanding over others, such 
structures are not insurmountable or deterministic of an actors’ agency: Renegotiations of 
structures, identities, and policy directions can, and do, occur.
In addition to observed material elements of security risk, discourses of threat and referent 
construction play a large role in how counterterrorism laws are introduced, formed, and justified. 
Processes of identity construction greatly influence structures of meaning around issues of 
security and insecurity. These structures influence not just the collective understanding of what a 
security risk is perceived as “being”, but also in what way such a risk can and should be 
responded to. As such this mutually constitutive relationship establishing the need for and 
substance of particular measures affects not just legal substance, but also the vocabularies and 
meanings informing how we understand insecurity beyond official policy-making. Further 
research into relational underpinnings of threat/referent construction during securitization would 
encourage continued discussions on how counterterrorism laws are established, normalized, or 
revisited. Focusing on the social construction of identity around counterterrorism law would 
acknowledge the material and symbolic effects of labeling, as well as open up space for 
alternative inquiries into our research and practice of counterterrorism. 
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